

# The Commonwealth of Massachusetts Executive Office of Health & Human Services Department of Mental Retardation 500 Harrison Avenue

Boston, MA 02118

Timothy Murphy Secretary

Gerald J. Morrissey, Jr. Commissioner

Area Code (617) 727-5608 TTY: (617) 624-7590

Mitt Romney Governor Kerry Healey ieutenant Governor

> May 23, 2006 Appeal of Final Decision

Dear Mr. & Mrs.

Enclosed please find the recommended decision of the hearing officer in the above appeal. She held a fair hearing on the appeal of your client's eligibility determination.

The hearing officer's recommended decision made findings of fact, proposed conclusions of law and a recommended decision. After reviewing the hearing officer's recommended decision, I find that it is in accordance with the law and with DMR regulations and therefore adopt its findings of fact; conclusions of law and reasoning as my own. Your appeal is therefore denied.

You, or any person aggreeved by this decision may appeal to the Superior Court in accordance with G.L. c. 30A. The regulations governing the appeal process are 115 CMR 6.30-6.34 and 801 CMR 1.01-1.04.

Sincerely.

Commissioner

GJM/ecw

Deirdre Rosenberg, Hearing Officer cc:

Marianne Meacham, General Counsel Amanda Chalmers, Regional Director

Patricia Shook, Psychologist

Veronica Wolfe: Regional Eligibility Manager

Kum Ladue, Assistant General Counsel

Setor-Hemandez, Field Operations Senior Project Manager

### COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS DEPARTMENT OF MENTAL RETARDATION

In Re: Appeal of

This decision is assued pursuant to the regulations of the Department of Mental Retardation (DMR of Department), (115 CMR 6.30-6.34) and M.G.L. c. 30A.

was denied DMR supports by the Department on December 3, 2003, on the grounds that he did not meet its definition of mental The Appellant, retardation, as set forth at 115 CMR 2.01. He appealed that decision, and a fair hearing was initially heldfon October 14, 2005; but was suspended after approximately forty-five minutes so that the Appellant's parents could retain legal counsel. The hearing continued on February 3s 2006. Both hearings were held at the Department of Mental Retardation's Hogan Regional Center at 450 Maple Avenue, Hathorne, MA. Those present were:

Elaine W. Cockeroft

Barbara Fortier

Kim LaDue Patricia Shook Sandra Brennan

Veronica Wolfe

Appellant

Appellant's mother Appellant's father Counsel for Appellant (second hearing only)

LICSW on behalf of Appellant

(first hearing only) Counsel for DMR

Eligibility Psychologist for DMR Eligibility Coordinator (observer)

(first hearing only)

Regional Eligibility Manager

(first hearing only)

The evidence consists of the following exhibits submitted by DMR, and approximately two hours of testimony:

- DMR Eligibility Report, dated December 19, 2006 1
- Public Schools, dated June 2000 Psychological Test Report. 2.
- Denial of Eligibility Letter, dated December 3, 2003
- Individualized Education Program (IEP), dated March 28, 2003 4.
- Educational Evaluation, dated March 20, 2003 5.

### BACKGROUND

The Amellant is a 21 year old man who is currently a residential student at the

in Massachusetts. Immediately prior to aftending the

the Appellant attended the

Massachusetts, for two years and before that was envolved in the

since he entered kindergarten. He lives with his parents in

Massachusetts. His primary diagnosis is Autism Disorder.

## SUMMARY OF THE EVIDENCE

The earliest cognitive assessment of in the record is from 1992, when was seven years old. Although the original report of this evaluation was not included in the materials provided me, the results are discussed in Exhibit #2, Public Schools, which was prepared in June, Psychological Test Report of the Public Schools, which was prepared in June, 2000. His scores from the 1992 tests (WISC=R) are as follows:

Verbal IQ 90

Performance IQ 64

Exhibit #2 also includes test results from 1997, when was eleven years, eight months old. The test administered was the WISC-III, and he achieved the following scores:

Verbal IQ 100

Performance IQ 75

In neither the 1992 nor the 1997 evaluation were full-scale IQ scores computed, presumably because of the wide discrepancy between the Verbal and the Performance scores. Exhibit #2 does not mention by whom, or under what circumstances, the 1992 and 1997 tests were administered.

The testing (WISC-III) actually conducted as part of the Psychological Test Report of the Public Schools in 2000 is consistent with the two earlier evaluations.

Was 15 years old at the time of the June, 2000 evaluation:

Verbal IQ 9

Performance IQ 65

This report states that "the 29-point difference between states and states that "the 29-point difference between states are states and states are states and states are states are states as the states are st

Replanmance scores was large enough to be considered clinically significant." Therefore, subjest results were examined, and, according to the testor, the Appellant's Verbai Comprehension subjest scores clustered in the average to above average range. (Exhibit #2)

The Appellant's final cognitive assessment was conducted on September 23, 2003, by the Public Schools (Exhibit #6): was 18 years, 3 months old at the time. Because mental retardation must be established before an applicant who is seeking adult services reaches the age of eighteen, I have not considered these test results in making my decision.

DMR's expert witness, Dr. Patricia Shook, testified that when there is a wide discrepancy between a person's verbal 10 score and performance IQ score, as is the case here; it indicates that the individual being tested has a learning disability in certain areas, rather than being mentally retarded. She stated that individuals with mental retardation usually display a flatter test score profile.

As can be seen.

As can be seen.

Sthree Verbal: IQ scores from 1992, 1997, and 2000 were all in the low average to average intelligence range. In addition, his Verbal comprehension subtest scores clustered in the average to above average range in the 2000 assessment. Based upon these scores, and on Dr. Shook stestingny that it was her opinion that the great profiles suggest that he has a learning disability rather than mental retardation. Thave concluded that the Appellant does not meet the Department's criteria for mental retardation.

s parents argue that their son's test results do not give a full picture of him. They are particularly concerned about his behavior as it relates to safety issues.

According to Mrs.

is fascinated with steam, smoke, and fire. He has set small offers in our kitchen to see the smoke. When we are away from home and he is with a baby sitter, we must remove the fuse to the stove to avoid potential danger. Wandlers, is unpulsive, talks indiscriminately to strangers, and has extremely poor decision-making skills. Exhibit #21.

In addition, his mother testified that the Appellant cannot perform in the workplace without constant supervision.

Barbara Fortier, LICSW for the Public Schools, also testified that testing does not capture selected in the selection of functioning, mentioning specifically his need for constant supervision, and his obsession with steam and vents. These concerns were voiced in many of the reports in the record. (See, for example, Exhibits #11, 15 and 19)

Although I cannot consider this evidence in making my decision, since some si

#### FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

After a careful review of all of the evidence, and despite the Appellant's obvious need for continuing support. I find that he has failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence that he meets the DMR eligibility criteria. My specific reasons are as follows:

In order to be eligible for DMR supports, an individual who is 18 years of age or older must meet the three criteria set forth at 115 CMR 6.03:

- a) he must be domiciled in the Commonwealth,
- b) he must be a person with Mental Retardation as defined in 115 CMR 2.01, and
- 6) he must be in need of specialized supports in two or more of the following seven adaptive skill areas: communication, self-care, home living, community use, health and safety, functional academics, and work.

There is no dispute that the Appellant meets the first criterion and I specifically find that he meets that criterion. However, I find that he is not mentally retarded as that term is defined at 115 CMR 2.01.

By statute, M.G.L. c. 123B; section 1, a mentally retarded person "is a person who as a result of inadequately developed or impaired intelligence, as determined by clinical authorities as described in the regulations of the department, is substantially limited in his ability to learn or adapt, as judged by established standards available for the evaluation of a person's ability to function in the community."

Consistent with its statutory mandate, DMR has adopted the American Association on Mental Retardation (AAMR) standards as the clinical authority to which it refers in determining whether an individual has "inadequately developed or impaired intelligence." The AAMR standards establish a three-prong test: (a) the individual must have significantly sub-average intellectual functioning defined as an IQ score of approximately 70 to 75 or below, based on assessments that include one or more individually administered general intelligence tests, (b) related limitations in two or more of the following adaptive skill areas: communication, self care, home living, social skills, community use, self direction, health and safety, functional academics, leisure and work must exist concurrently with sub-average intellectual functioning, and the individual must have manifested criteria (a) and (b) before the age of 18.

were all in the low average to average intelligence range. Also, his Verbal Comprehension subjects storm the 2000 evaluation were in the average to above average range. Basediupon these test results, and the testimony of Dr. Patricia Shook, the Department's testimony of Individual the Appellant's not mentally separately as that terms a 1sed in statute and regulations of the determination of eligibility for DMR supports. Because the Appellant subject to show that he has significantly suppresenge intellectual function, it was not necessary for me to consider his adaptive functioning.

#### APPEAL

Any person aggriced by a final decision of the Department may appeal to the Superior Court in accordance with M.G.L.c. 30A [115 CMR 6.34(5)]:

Date

Deirdre Rosenberg Hearing Officer