Even if the separation is voluntary, an employee is entitled to benefits if the underlying reason is for good cause attributable to the employing unit or its agent. The circumstances leading to the separation need not be company policy or known to policy‑level management in order to constitute good cause, as long as the supervisory‑management personnel appeared to have authority to act as they did.

Note:  In good cause quit cases DUA generally requires the claimant to bring the issue to the employer's attention and take reasonable steps to try to resolve the problem before quitting. This could include using any available appeal or grievance procedure, formal or informal, to try to resolve it. In some situations, this requirement may be met by something as simple as the employee bringing a problem to the attention of his or her supervisor.

On the other hand, DUA will sometimes attempt to impose a requirement that an employee pursue a grievance to the highest possible level. Advocates should be aware that the requirement of bringing the problem to the employer's attention is not statutory. They should be prepared to argue that, under the employee's circumstance, it was reasonable to forgo the complaint procedure entirely or stop after the first level. In cases involving allegations of sexual, racial or other unreasonable harassment, the claimant need only show that the employer knew or should have known of the harassment, and "need not show that she took all or even ‘reasonable' steps to preserve her employment." Tri-County Youth Programs v. Director of the Dept. of Employment and Training, 54 Mass. App. Ct. 405, 413, 765 N.E.2d 810, 817 (2002). G.L. c. 151A, § 25(e), ¶ 5; 430 CMR § 4.04(5)(c). See Question 26.

Reasonable disciplinary action is not good cause for leaving. Leone v. Director of the Div. of Employment Sec., 397 Mass. 728, 493 N.E.2d 493 (1986) (bank branch manager disqualified for quitting after being warned about inability to get along with supervisor). See also Fergione v. Director of the Div. of Employment Sec., 396 Mass. 281, 485 N.E.2d 949 (1985). However, the Board of Review recently held that where the record established that the claimant received an unreasonable unpaid suspension from work which was inconsistent with the employer’s own disciplinary policy, the claimant had good cause for leaving work. BR-118451 (7/15/11).

Good cause is most often found where the employer violates the employee's rights, fails to correct unsafe or unhealthy work conditions, reduces the employee's compensation, subjects the employee to unfair or unduly harsh criticism or changes the work to something "antithetical" to that for which the employee was hired.

In Guarino v. Director of the Div. of Employment Sec., 393 Mass. 89, 469 N.E.2d 802 (1984), remand was required for findings on whether the claimant, a fish packer, was required to perform additional duties that were not part of her job, and whether there were available remedies she had failed to pursue. Notably, the Court rejected the notion that the claimant must request a transfer to other work or a leave of absence in these circumstances.

Addressing the issue of when unhealthy work conditions constitute good cause for separation, the Board of Review held that a claimant who worked extended hours over her entire two-month employment period (including 98 hours in 6 days) had good cause to quit, even where the claimant “was aware of what her schedule would be when she accepted the position with the employer.” BR-112118 (3/03/2011). The Board did not base its opinion specifically on Massachusetts labor laws, but instead asserted that it was simply “not reasonable to require an employee to work under those conditions indefinitely until the employer increases its workforce.”

An employer may not defeat the payment of unemployment compensation by reducing an employee's hours to the point where he or she must quit, Manias v. Director of the Div. of Employment Sec., 388 Mass. 201, 445 N.E.2d 1068 (1983) (employer changed claimant's schedule to eliminate most of her overtime), or laying him or her off and offering to reemploy the employee at substantially reduced wages. Graves v. Director of the Div. of Employment Sec., 384 Mass. 766, 429 N.E.2d 705 (1981). If an employer reduces an employee's hours with the result that the employee would neither qualify for partial benefits under G.L. c. 151A, § 29(b) nor be able to earn a living wage, the employee may have an urgent, compelling and necessitous reason for leaving work. SRH § 1220(G). See Question 29.

A decision by the Board of Review suggests either an indefinite or a permanent reduction in hours qualifies as good cause. In BR-110763 (3/28/2010), the Board determined that when an employer unilaterally reduced the claimant’s hours by half, creating a “drastic change in the conditions of the claimant’s employment,” the claimant had good cause attributable to her employer to resign. This was so even though the Board specifically determined as a finding of fact that “the employer expected that the reduction in hours would occur only until the economy improved.” Id. Thus, the fact that the reduction in hours was indefinite did not mean that the claimant did not have good cause to resign based on the reduction in her hours.

Unfulfilled promises concerning pay or benefits can constitute good cause for leaving employment, if the promise was sufficiently definite. A remand was required in Svoboda v. Director of the Div. of Employment Sec., 386 Mass. 1004, 436 N.E.2d 1218 (1982), for findings on whether the employer had failed to pay the claimant in accordance with the employment agreement, for such a failure could have constituted good cause for leaving. See also SRH § 1222(E).

A remand for findings on this issue was also required in Hunt v. Director of the Div. of Employment Sec., 397 Mass. 46, 489 N.E.2d 696 (1986), where the employer hired the claimant as a temporary secretary with representations that the position would probably become permanent after six months, and permanency would have entitled the claimant to employee benefits. The claimant left after the employer extended her temporary status indefinitely.

If the employer changes a job so that it becomes significantly different from the job which the employee originally accepted it may be considered "unsuitable." If an employee's job becomes unsuitable, then he or she has good cause to leave it. McDonald v. Director of the Div. of Employment Sec., 396 Mass. 468, 487 N.E.2d 186 (1986). The burden of establishing unsuitability is on the claimant. For a more detailed explanation of the "suitability" requirement, see Question 8.

Subjective Complaints and Unwarranted Disappointment in the Job Do Not Constitute Good Cause

Good cause for leaving does not exist where the claimant expected or requested a raise which was not unconditionally promised. See SRH § 1222(D).

A claimant's "mere" disappointment with pay, working conditions or management, where there was no justifiable expectation that conditions would be otherwise, is not good cause attributable to the employing unit. In Fanion v. Director of the Div. of Employment Sec., 391 Mass. 848, 464 N.E.2d 69 (1984), the claimant accepted a change in position with a pay increase to take place after six months. After five months she learned the details of the increase, felt that the pay was not commensurate with the pressures of the job, quit and was disqualified. See also LeBlanc v. Director of the Div. of Employment Sec., 398 Mass. 1010, 501 N.E.2d 503 (1986). However, if the pressures of the job were such as to affect the claimant’s health, her leaving may be for non-disqualifying urgent, compelling and necessitous reasons. See Questions 29 – 32.

In Sohler v. Director of the Div. of Employment Sec., 377 Mass. 785, 388 N.E.2d 299 (1979), a hospital employee was disqualified for voluntarily leaving without good cause where she testified to "subjective" complaints regarding mismanagement by the hospital that made her working conditions tense and frustrating, without proving that she was being required to perform work substantially different from that for which she was initially employed or that substandard conditions at the hospital subjected her to professional sanction or criminal or civil liability or had an adverse effect on her health. See also Berk v. Director of the Div. of Employment Sec., 387 Mass. 1003, 441 N.E.2d 531 (1982) (alleged mismanagement of a preschool); Wagstaff v. Director of the Div. of Employment Sec., 322 Mass. 664, 79 N.E.2d 3 (1948) (denial affirmed where Board of Review found claimant left because of general dissatisfaction with the job and failure of employer to grant a pay raise).

Disappointment of a claimant who is a substantial shareholder with the company's financial performance (as with disappointment with pay or working conditions) does not constitute good cause for resignation. Abramowitz v. Director of the Div. of Employment Sec., 390 Mass. 168, 454 N.E.2d 92 (1983).