Transferable Skills. Managerial skills have universal applicability (across industry lines); transfer can therefore be accomplished with very little vocational adjustment, even in an individual of advanced age. Pain rejected as disabling because non-examining physician took pain into account in determining RFC, and claimant takes only aspirin.

Generally, a remand order is an interlocutory order that does not divest a court of jurisdiction over a case. Absent a clear statement to the contrary, legislation should not ordinarily be interpreted to oust a federal court's equitable power, or its jurisdiction over a pending case. Social Security Disability Benefits Reform Act of 1984 requires use of the "medical improvement" standard in continuing disability reviews. Where statute provides that "[t]he Secretary shall notify [an individual class member] by certified mail that he may request a review of" his disqualification, district court has authority to establish the content of the notice. Orders requiring SSA to issue specific notices and to follow certain procedures for determining class membership were like an injunction and were appealable on an interlocutory basis.

Leading case setting out analysis to be used in analyzing pain. There must be a clinically determinable medical impairment that can reasonably be expected to produce the pain alleged. Other evidence including statements of the claimant or his doctor, consistent with the medical findings, shall be part of the calculus. Symptoms such as pain can result in greater severity of impairment than may be clearly demonstrated by the objective physical manifestations of a disorder. ALJ must consider six factors in evaluating a claimant's subjective allegations of pain: (1) The nature, location, onset, duration, frequency, radiation, and intensity of any pain; (2) Precipitating and aggravating factors (e.g., movement, activity, environmental conditions); (3) Type, dosage, effectiveness, and adverse side-effects of any pain medication; (4) Treatment, other than medication, for relief of pain; (5) Functional restrictions; and (6) The claimant's daily activities. Where the degree of pain alleged is greater than that which can reasonably be anticipated based on the objective physical findings the Secretary should explore other information. SSR 82-58.

Pain can constitute a significant nonexertional impairment which precludes naked application of the Grid and requires use of a vocational expert. The medical-vocational guidelines are not dispositive of the status of persons whose exertional limitations are further complicated by other non-exertional ailments. The Secretary must engage in an "individualized analysis" to determine whether the combination of exertional and nonexertional impairments, in light of the claimant's age, education, and work experience, renders her disabled. Conflicts in the evidence are for the Secretary to resolve. Court suggests Secretary present "more specific expert evidence concerning [the claimant's] ability to function in the workplace, coupled with a vocational expert's testimony as to the availability of jobs in the national economy which someone possessing claimant's ... limitations might fill." Secretary not obliged to take claimant's assertions of disabling pain at face value.

An ALJ's credibility determinations are owed "considerable deference." Claimant did not seek medical treatment during the time in question therefore there was no credible medical evidence supporting claim of pain during that time period. Appeals Council in this own motion review, did not have to defer to the ALJ's interpretation. Complaints of pain need not be precisely corroborated by objective findings, but they must be consistent with medical findings. Where there is no credible medical evidence to support claim of pain, the Appeals Council does not have to defer to the ALJ's interpretation. Court upholds ALJ's finding that claimant's severe dysthymic disorder met listing 12.04. Where claimant did not seek medical treatment for pain, there was no credible evidence supporting the claim of pain. Complaints of pain need not be precisely corroborated by objective findings, but they must be consistent with medical findings.

ALJ erred in concluding that treating doctor’s report was based solely on claimant’s subjective complaints.

The Court "pays particular attention' to the ALJ's evaluation of complaints of pain in light of their subjective nature," quoting Sherwin v. Sec'y HHS, 685 F.2d 1,3 (1st. Cir. 1982). Under SSR 85-15, the ability to be punctual, attending work on a consistent basis and staying at work all day are demanded by any work environment, regardless of skill level. Moderate limitations in these abilities may erode the occupational base "at lease marginally and possibly more so." Conflicts in evidence are for the Commissioner, not the courts, to resolve. Where a nonexertional limitation only marginally reduces the claimant's ability to perform a full range of unskilled work, the ALJ was justified in basing his determination that the claimant was not disabled on the Grids.

ALJ is not qualified to interpret raw medical data in functional terms, but in this case, ALJ warranted in finding that claimant's physical impairments do not impose significant exertional limits without medical assessment of RFC. ALJ's observations at hearing were important Avery considerations in light of paucity of medical evidence. ALJ's observation of disability benefits claimant's demeanor at hearing provided substantial evidence for conclusion that nonexertional impairments did not disable claimant, in light of paucity of medical evidence to suggest objective physical basis for disabling pain and vocational expert testimony that claimant could perform the jobs he identified even if she suffered a constant light pain.

ALJ was free to rely solely on the Grids where he found that nonexertional impairments did not have a significant impact on the claimant's ability to perform the full range of sedentary work. Complaints of pain found credible only in part. Because claimant sought no treatment for pain, ALJ was free to discount complaints of severity. Because pain did not significantly limit claimant's ability to work, ALJ was permitted to base his decision entirely on the GRIDS.

Remand in pain case where ALJ mischaracterized claimant’s description of her daily activities and made inadequare findings re: pain.

Cert. denied 444 U.S. 858, 100 S.Ct. 120, 62 L.Ed.2d 78 (1979). The Secretary is not at the mercy of every claimant's subjective assertions of pain," however, administrative law judges should make specific findings when the issue of pain arises.

Discussion of observable signs of pain. ALJ under no duty to go to "inordinate lengths to develop a claimant's case." Holding that Secretary is not at the mercy of every claimant's subjective assertions of pain applies equally well to subjective claims of dizziness. Claimant must show that her impairment is "medically determinable" and only in a rare case can she do this without medical evidence.

Claimant's fully healed right knee fusion does not constitute a medically determinable cause of claimant's subjective complaints of disabling pain. Subjective complaints of pain must be considered and evaluated, but only if there is a medically determinable impairment that could cause the pain. Court noted that a diagnosis of psychological disorder that transforms emotions into pain is a sufficient basis for the finding of a medical or medically determinable impairment.