ALJ does not have to explicitly state that she is discrediting the claimant's subjective testimony concerning the extent of his pain.

Leading case setting out analysis to be used in analyzing pain. There must be a clinically determinable medical impairment that can reasonably be expected to produce the pain alleged. Other evidence including statements of the claimant or his doctor, consistent with the medical findings, shall be part of the calculus. Symptoms such as pain can result in greater severity of impairment than may be clearly demonstrated by the objective physical manifestations of a disorder. ALJ must consider six factors in evaluating a claimant's subjective allegations of pain: (1) The nature, location, onset, duration, frequency, radiation, and intensity of any pain; (2) Precipitating and aggravating factors (e.g., movement, activity, environmental conditions); (3) Type, dosage, effectiveness, and adverse side-effects of any pain medication; (4) Treatment, other than medication, for relief of pain; (5) Functional restrictions; and (6) The claimant's daily activities. Where the degree of pain alleged is greater than that which can reasonably be anticipated based on the objective physical findings the Secretary should explore other information. SSR 82-58.

An ALJ's credibility determinations are owed "considerable deference." Claimant did not seek medical treatment during the time in question therefore there was no credible medical evidence supporting claim of pain during that time period. Appeals Council in this own motion review, did not have to defer to the ALJ's interpretation. Complaints of pain need not be precisely corroborated by objective findings, but they must be consistent with medical findings. Where there is no credible medical evidence to support claim of pain, the Appeals Council does not have to defer to the ALJ's interpretation. Court upholds ALJ's finding that claimant's severe dysthymic disorder met listing 12.04. Where claimant did not seek medical treatment for pain, there was no credible evidence supporting the claim of pain. Complaints of pain need not be precisely corroborated by objective findings, but they must be consistent with medical findings.

Approves administrative notice of occupational reference materials for information regarding various types of work. Court notes that the 4th circuit has held that the Secretary may rely on general categories in the Supplement to the DOT as presumptively applicable to the claimant's past work. Claimant's burden to prove an inability to perform her former type of work. necessarily includes an obligation to produce evidence on that issue. Claimant must not only show that she cannot do her former job, she must demonstrate that she cannot return to her former type of work. Opinions of non-examining consulting physicians are entitled to weight. Physician's conclusory statements about claimant's disability not binding on Secretary. The Secretary can rely on a job held more than 10 years ago in determining whether claimant can return to prior work. In order to meet burden at step 4, claimant must establish that she cannot return to her former type of work, not just her inability to return to a particular past job.

Fact that claimant failed to seek medical treatment was arguably inconsistent with his complaint of pain and lent credence to suspicions that he may have been exaggerating. Only when claimant meets his burden to establish that he's unable to return to his former work is there a need for SSA to show that there's available work. Purpose of D.Ct. review is to make a determination of whether the findings of the Secretary are supported by substantial evidence, not to conduct a de novo review of the evidence proffered at the ALJ level. The facts that appellee allegedly took no medication, slept 11-13 hours a night and failed to seek medical treatment are arguably inconsistent with his complaints of pain and lend credence to the Secretary's suspicions that he may have been exaggerating.