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Non-Examining Physicians

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Westlaw Citation Barrientos V. Sec'y HHS

Consulting examiner's opinions carry no less weight than those of the treating physician. Post - McDonald decision. Discussion of SSR 85-28.

1/1/1987
Westlaw Citation Berrios Lopez V. Sec'y HHS, No. 91-1294

Report of non-examining, non-testifying physician may, under some circumstances, act as substantial evidence to support a finding that a claimant is not disabled.

1/1/1991
Westlaw Citation Browne V. Richardson

A written report submitted by a non- testifying, non-examining physician who merely reviewed the written medical evidence could not alone constitute substantial evidence to support the Secretary's conclusion. The report "lacks the assurance of reliability that comes on the one hand from first-hand observation and professional examination or, on the other, from first-hand testimony subject to claimant's cross-examination. It is hearsay based on hearsay.

1/1/1972
Westlaw Citation Gordils V. Sec'y HHS

ALJ may make common sense judgments about functional capacity based on medical findings as long as he does not overstep the bounds of a lay person's competence and render a medical judgment. Evidence regarding claimant's daily activities and demeanor at the hearing, plus doctor's findings of no consistent neurological deficit and no objective evidence of lumbo-sacral root syndrome, constitute substantial evidence to support the finding that claimant's pain, viewed as a non-exertional impairment, did not significantly impair claimant's ability to perform the full range of sedentary work. Whether or not a consultative report of a non-examining physician constitutes substantial evidence depends upon the circumstances of the case.

1/1/1990
Westlaw Citation Gray V. Heckler

Approves administrative notice of occupational reference materials for information regarding various types of work. Court notes that the 4th circuit has held that the Secretary may rely on general categories in the Supplement to the DOT as presumptively applicable to the claimant's past work. Claimant's burden to prove an inability to perform her former type of work. necessarily includes an obligation to produce evidence on that issue. Claimant must not only show that she cannot do her former job, she must demonstrate that she cannot return to her former type of work. Opinions of non-examining consulting physicians are entitled to weight. Physician's conclusory statements about claimant's disability not binding on Secretary. The Secretary can rely on a job held more than 10 years ago in determining whether claimant can return to prior work. In order to meet burden at step 4, claimant must establish that she cannot return to her former type of work, not just her inability to return to a particular past job.

1/1/1985
Westlaw Citation Guzman Dias V. Sec'y HEW

Disparity between claimant's symptoms and medication prescribed did not compel conclusion that doctor was inaccurate in describing severity of claimant's mental impairments, even though that inference could be drawn. Doctor was a general practitioner, not a psychiatrist. Court comments that ALJ's conclusion about schizophrenic claimant's mental RFC is incredible and that the evidence was not weighed in and sifted in a balanced and even-handed manner. ALJ had already heard case initially and on remand from district court. Testimony of a non-examining medical advisor--to be distinguished from the non-testimonial written reports in the instant case--can alone constitute substantial evidence, depending on the circumstances.

1/1/1980
Westlaw Citation Rodriguez V. Sec'y HHS

The testimony of a non-examining medical advisor--to be distinguished from the non-testimonial written reports in the instant case--can alone constitute substantial evidence, depending on the circumstances. Substantial evidence does not exist to support a finding that exertional impairments are not disabling where the record does not contain any evidence of RFC. The ALJ is not qualified to assess RFC on the basis of bare medical findings.

1/1/1989
Westlaw Citation Rose V. Shalala

Even though Chronic Fatigue Syndrome POMS were promulgated after adverse ALJ decision, previous version of same section of POMS re: evaluation of Epstein Barr Virus set forth the same principles. Since historically, EBV and CFS have been used interchangeably (even though the medical evidence is questionable as to whether EBV causes CFS), as a practical matter, the EBV POMS can be applied to CFS cases. Given the uncontroverted evidence that the claimant suffered from CFS, blind reliance on a lack of objective findings is wholly inconsistent with the Secretary's policy as expressed in the POMS and in other pertinent policy statements. No need for objective medical findings. "At this point there is no 'dipstick' laboratory test for chronic fatigue syndrome;" the medical community instead uses an "operational" diagnostic procedure, so the disease is "not per se excluded from coverage because it cannot be conclusively diagnosed in a laboratory setting." The absence of definitive diagnostic tests makes it plain that the failure of some doctors to state conclusive diagnoses does not constitute substantial evidence to support a finding that the claimant did not suffer from CFS. Opinion of non-treating non-examining doctor that fatigue did not cause significant functional limitations because there was no objective abnormality found to explain the fatigue is not entitled to any weight. The amount of weight given the conclusions of non-testifying, non-examining physicians will vary with the circumstances, including the nature of the illness and the information provided the expert. The Grid is based on a claimant's exertional capacity and can only be applied when claimant's nonexertional limitations do not significantly impair claimant's ability to perform at a given exertional level. Where hypothetical to VE assumed a condition not supported by the medical evidence, the ALJ could not rely on the VE's opinion as a basis for non-disability finding.

1/1/1994
Westlaw Citation Torres V. Sec'y HHS

ALJ must determine what evidence he credits in order to pose a hypothetical which will be relevant and helpful. The issue of whether or not the testimony of a medical advisor who reviews the record and testifies at the hearing can alone constitute substantial evidence varies with the circumstances, including the nature of the illness and the information provided. The testimony of a non-examining medical advisor--to be distinguished from the non-testimonial written reports in the instant case--can alone constitute substantial evidence, depending on the circumstances.

1/1/1989
Westlaw Citation Tremblay V. Sec'y HHS

Although views of medical advisor are not always by themselves substantial evidence when medical advisor does not examine claimant, this rule is of limited value in a case involving a condition alleged to have existed many years before, and where claimant's proof of disability is slight. Conflict between evidence provided by the medical advisor and the treating physician is for Secretary to resolve. The principle enunciated in Browne is by no means an absolute rule. Findings of a non-testifying, non-examining physician by themselves, may constitute substantial evidence, in the face of a treating physician's conclusory statement of disability.

1/1/1982


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