Pain can constitute a significant nonexertional impairment which precludes naked application of the Grid and requires use of a vocational expert. The medical-vocational guidelines are not dispositive of the status of persons whose exertional limitations are further complicated by other non-exertional ailments. The Secretary must engage in an "individualized analysis" to determine whether the combination of exertional and nonexertional impairments, in light of the claimant's age, education, and work experience, renders her disabled. Conflicts in the evidence are for the Secretary to resolve. Court suggests Secretary present "more specific expert evidence concerning [the claimant's] ability to function in the workplace, coupled with a vocational expert's testimony as to the availability of jobs in the national economy which someone possessing claimant's ... limitations might fill." Secretary not obliged to take claimant's assertions of disabling pain at face value.

Case remanded to resolve discrepancy between DDS examiner, who concluded claimant had a severe impairment and could not return to former heavy work, and ALJ who found claimant could return to former work and gave no explanation for rejecting the examiner's opinion.

District Court erred by reweighing the evidence. The resolution of conflicting evidence is solely within the province of the Secretary and the District Court is required to accept as conclusive the Secretary's determination, if supported by substantial evidence.

Conflicts in evidence are for the Commissioner to resolve. Inference could be drawn that claimant would have secured more treatment if her pain had been as intense as alleged. Court will review ALJ decisions to determine if they are supported by substantial evidence. Court must uphold the Secretary's findings if a reasonable mind, reviewing the evidence in the record as a whole, could accept it as adequate to support his conclusion. Gaps in the medical record that show a lack of treatment are "evidence" for purposes of the disability determination.

The Court "pays particular attention' to the ALJ's evaluation of complaints of pain in light of their subjective nature," quoting Sherwin v. Sec'y HHS, 685 F.2d 1,3 (1st. Cir. 1982). Under SSR 85-15, the ability to be punctual, attending work on a consistent basis and staying at work all day are demanded by any work environment, regardless of skill level. Moderate limitations in these abilities may erode the occupational base "at lease marginally and possibly more so." Conflicts in evidence are for the Commissioner, not the courts, to resolve. Where a nonexertional limitation only marginally reduces the claimant's ability to perform a full range of unskilled work, the ALJ was justified in basing his determination that the claimant was not disabled on the Grids.

Court must uphold the Secretary's findings if a reasonable mind, reviewing the evidence in the record as a whole, could accept it as adequate to support his conclusion.

Court consider the medical opinion given by one or more physicians designated by the Secretary in deciding medical equivalence. Disability finding for widow's benefits requires meeting or medical equivalence to a listed impairment. It is for the Secretary, not the court, to resolve conflicts in the evidence. The weight to which opinions of medical advisors are entitled will vary with the circumstances, including the nature of the illness and the information provided the expert. Obviously, the fact that the experts have neither examined nor testified lessens the probative power of their reports.

Although views of medical advisor are not always by themselves substantial evidence when medical advisor does not examine claimant, this rule is of limited value in a case involving a condition alleged to have existed many years before, and where claimant's proof of disability is slight. Conflict between evidence provided by the medical advisor and the treating physician is for Secretary to resolve. The principle enunciated in Browne is by no means an absolute rule. Findings of a non-testifying, non-examining physician by themselves, may constitute substantial evidence, in the face of a treating physician's conclusory statement of disability.