Court holds that the catalyst theory is not a permissible basis for an award of attorneys fees under the Fair Housing Act and the ADA. Instead, to be a "prevailing party," a party must have secured a judgement on the merits or a court ordered consent decree. This decision will affect attorneys fees petitions the Equal Access to Justice Act, which uses prevailing party status in determining entitlement to attorneys fees.

cert. granted and judgment vacated 507 U.S. 956, 113 S.Ct. 1378, 122 L.Ed.2d 754 (1993). Prevailing party status is appropriate where claimant established a significant procedural due process deprivation and obtained an enforceable nominal damage award. Court applies de novo, rather than abuse of discretion, review to the district court's prevailing party determination. Court applied abuse of discretion review to the size of award.

EAJA fees denied because Plaintiff did not meet definition of prevailing party. Plaintiff's success on remand pursuant to Reform Act of 1984 was not a litigatory success, nor was it a catalyst to the passage of legislation to the passage of legislation changing the standard. The Court rejected the "was going to win anyway" approach.

Absent an express indication to the contrary, a district court may retain jurisdiction pending a fourth sentence remand and thereafter render final judgment for EAJA purposes. Overruled by Shalala v. Schaefer 509 U.S. 292, 113 S.Ct. 2625, 125 L.Ed. 239 (1993) (Once a district court remands a case pursuant to sentence four of §405(g), the same court may not retain jurisdiction over the case. Rather, the court must enter judgment so as to start the EAJA clock ticking).