Funding is specifically earmarked to hire attorneys and legal support
The Editorial Team of Clearinghouse Review: Journal of Poverty Law and
Policy, published by the Sargent Shriver National Center on Poverty
Law, invites you to attend this free, 75-minute webinar on Thursday,
October 2, 2008, at 11 a.m. Pacific time, noon Mountain time, 1 p.m.
On Jul 31, 12:40 pm, Catherine Dorn Schreiber
By: Jonathan Weiss
St. John’s Law Student
American Bankruptcy Institute Law Review Staff
In S. White Transportation, Inc.,[1]the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Mississippi held that secured creditor had “participated” in the chapter 11 case and was bound by a plan voiding its lien because it received notice, even though it had not appeared or taken any action in the case.[2] The debtor, S. White Transportation, Inc. (“SWT”), had challenged the validity of a Deed of Trust with the creditor, Acceptance Loan Company, Inc. (“Acceptance”) in state court on the basis that the individuals who had signed the Deed of Trust on behalf of SWT did not have the authority to do so.[3] Consistent with its claims in state court, SWT’s proposed chapter 11 plan classified Acceptance’s lien as a disputed claim on which no payment would be made.[4] Two weeks after SWT’s chapter 11 plan was confirmed, Acceptance objected to the plan, requesting that the court find that its lien survived the confirmation unaffected.[5] The court held that the plan voided the lien and denied motions for relief and modification of the plan, and reaffirmed the old adage that litigants must not “sleep on their rights”.[6]
Wednesday, January 11th has been proclaimed as National Slavery and Human Trafficking Awareness Day.
Human trafficking is one of the most egregious human rights violations we see. It is a heinous crime of exploitation that involves forcing people to work for others for profit, whether through traditional types of labor or sexual exploitation. Victims are men, women, and children from our state, our country, and across the globe. Experts estimate that world-wide, 27 million people are trafficked annually bringing in $32 billion dollars. It is the fastest growing and second largest black market.
This past year, our office worked with legislators to enact a law that makes human trafficking a felony in our state and creates services for victims. The passage of this law has given us some important tools to combat trafficking, but more work needs to be done. To that end, we are beginning the work of our state wide task force made up of government and non-profit agencies to examine and address all aspects of trafficking.
Everyone has something to offer in the fight against human trafficking. Hospital, hotel, and transportation staff are in a unique position to identify victims. Educators and parents can encourage prevention and internet safety education. Today, everyone can take a moment to learn about the signs and consequences of human trafficking and all that we can do to prevent this exploitation.
To learn more about human trafficking and what you can do, visit the Attorney General’s website.
By: Jessica E. Stukonis
St. John’s Law Student
American Bankruptcy Institute Law Review Staff
An attorney who signed a proof of claim on his client’s behalf narrowly avoided disqualification in In re Duke Investments.[1] In Duke, the court refused to disqualify the attorney from representing his creditor-client in the chapter 11 case because the attorney was not a “necessary witness” despite his role in preparing, signing, and filing a creditor’s proof of claim.[2] The creditor’s attorney compiled the proof of claim based on information received from the creditor’s officers.[3] The court denied the debtor’s motion to disqualify the creditor’s attorney because the debtor failed to demonstrate that the attorney was a necessary witness. The attorney was not a necessary witness because he lacked “exclusive knowledge or understanding of the [proof of claim]. . . . [and the attorney’s] testimony would [not] be the sole source of information pertaining to the [proof of claim]”.[4] Moreover, even if the attorney was a “necessary witness,” he would not be disqualified because the debtor failed to demonstrate that his testimony would “substantially conflict” with Amergy’s testimony,[5] and Amergy consented to the attorney’s continued representation.[6]
By: Heather Hili
St. John’s Law Student
American Bankruptcy Institute Law Review Staff
Recently, in In re XMH Corp.,[1] the Seventh Circuit added trademark licenses to the types of intellectual property that cannot be assigned in bankruptcy without the licensor’s permission.[2] In 2009, XMH Corporation (“XMH”) and some of its subsidiaries sought relief under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code (“the Code”).[3] Blue, a debtor subsidiary of XMH, attempted to sell its assets to purchasers, Emerisque Brands and SKNL, including a trademark license agreement with Western Glove Works (“Western”).[4] The bankruptcy court refused to allow Blue to assign its trademark license agreement to the purchasers because Western would not consent to the assignment, and trademark law prohibits the non-consensual assignment of a trademark.[5]
By: Jonathan Abramovitz
St. John’s Law Student
American Bankruptcy Institute Law Review Staff
Recently, in In re Two Gales, Inc.,[1] the United States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Sixth Circuit (the “Panel”) held that 11 U.S.C. § 726(b) is not intended to serve as a basis for denying a claim for attorney’s fees, but rather serves as a priority scheme for dealing with distributions on allowed claims.[2] The law firm of Cupps & Garrison, LLC (“C & G”) represented Two Gales, Inc. (the “Debtor”) as its bankruptcy counsel before the case was converted from chapter 11 to chapter 7.[3] The bankruptcy court ordered C & G to disgorge its $10,000 retainer because the Debtor was administratively insolvent and, under section 726(b), chapter 7 administrative expenses are entitled to priority in proceedings converted from chapter 11 to chapter 7 where the debtor is administratively insolvent.[4] The Panel reversed, holding that before ordering disgorgement of C & G’s retainer, the lower court should have determined whether C & G had a properly perfected lien on its prepetition retainer under state law.[5]
By: Linda C. Attreed
St. John’s Law Student
American Bankruptcy Institute Law Review Staff
Adopting a narrow view of the section 362(b)(4)[1] “police and regulatory power” exception to the automatic stay, the Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Texas, in In re Reyes,[2] held that Josie Jones (“Jones”) and her attorney Robert Wilson (“Wilson”) violated the automatic stay provision by reporting the debtors to the Texas Real Estate Commission (“the TREC”).[3] The court determined that Jones and Wilson had intentionally prosecuted the TREC complaint “to punish the debtor for filing, and to exert pressure on the debtor in order to collect on the judgment.”[4] The court noted that Jones and Wilson filed the TREC action against the debtors approximately two months after seeking to lift the stay, and held that this was sufficient to support a finding of civil contempt.[5]